4. Solution of the Doubts

37. For the solution of this question [sc. from the preceding doubts, nn.34-36], an argument could be taken from the sacrament, because free intention is required in ministering this sacrament; but this fact is not as known as the fact about the freedom required for a contract.

38. [Solution of the first doubt] - As to the first [n.34] I concede that he who is threatened by this fear of sin, or of death, or of prison, should, according to reason, say the matrimonial words that are exacted of him, and so, consequently, he should consent interiorly in agreement with the words. Indeed, he is also bound, by necessity of safety for the moment, to have such a ‘to will’ and such an interior consent, just as he gives expression exteriorly in words, if such words he should give expression to. Nor yet does he by this consent transfer power over his body to another, because no consent makes a transfer in this way save a purely free one.

39. And if you say ‘this man at least freely has an act of will, therefore as far as in himself he does make the transfer’ - I reply: he does not freely have the act, because he has it only from fear, though the fear not be the sufficient efficient cause, but a cause strongly inducing him, just as he does not freely speak the exterior words, because he speaks from fear. Or it could be said that although by such ‘to will’ he does, as far as his own part is concerned, make a gift to the other, yet God, who is the superior lord in this transfer, does not ratify it unless it is purely free.

40. But from this it could be argued, against the aforesaid that, from the fact he knows he is not transferring his body (because he is not freely consenting), and he shows by an exterior sign that he is transferring, then he lies.

41. I reply: he shows he is transferring as far as it is in himself, though he knows he is not transferring, because he knows it is not ratified by the superior.

42. If therefore you say that then he should say, so as not to be lying, ‘I accept you for mine if the Lord permit it’ - I reply: this condition is always understood however absolute the speech, and his absolute word must in this way be understood, ‘I accept you for mine (supply: ‘as far as is in me, on presupposition of this violence’), and if God were - through such consent as I now have - to ratify that a handing over is taking place, I would hand over my body to you, and I do hand it over, as much as I can hand it over through such consent’.

43. [Solution of the second doubt] - As to the second, about obedience [n.35], some say that, just as one can be coerced into accepting some prelacy, and in every spiritual contract one is bound to obey - as a bishop, coerced by obedience, is bound to accept the church of which he is the spouse (whether it be so about a Religious, let me not here say) - so can someone be coerced in a matrimonial contract to give consent to such and such woman.

44. However I reply otherwise, that someone coerced by obedience to make a contract, and who does thus make it through fear of mortal sin, contracts it so he may keep justice, and therefore, he does so from the fact that no one is compelling him exteriorly, but he himself, by his own inclination and affirmation of justice, is interiorly inclined, by pure choice, to this sort of contract.The Vatican Editors note the following addition from some of the mss.: “But then it seems that the argument against the first opinion fails [n.43], because one would thus say that, having been coerced into the words by pure choice, one does consent to the words, because one has the consent by title of justice, lest one sin.” ⁸¹ And therefore I say that there is there a matrimony by choice, and he does truly make a contract. But not so if he were coerced into it by fear of pains or threats.

45. [Solution of the third doubt] - To the next [n.36], about the fear of pain or a neighbor’s sin, if only pain in the neighbor were feared it can be said that the consent, coerced by such fear, is not sufficient for matrimony, as was said before about fear of pain in oneself [n.44], because such consent would not be by a choice made in charity. But if sin against his neighbor were feared, and this fear be very certain, the perfect work would be if he were to accept her lest she would sin; and if he accept her, he would hold to the matrimony, because it would be a free consent by charity.

46. But whether he is bound to this by necessity of salvation, look elsewhere [Rep IVA d.29 q.1 n.15].